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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

)I

RON BENSON,
Petitioner,

)

vs.

]

PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND
TRAINING COUNCIL,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,
STATE OF UTAH

;
;
;

Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

)

Case No. 20080579

BRIEF OF APPELLANT RON BENSON

APPEAL FROM THE PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING COUNCIL

STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(l)(2008) and Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(a)
(2009) confer appellate jurisdiction upon the Utah Court of Appeals to review appeals
resulting from final orders of formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies.

This

case involves Petitioner Ron Benson's (herein "Mr. Benson") timely appeal from the
"Final Order" dated June 11, 2008, issued by Scott Stephenson, Director (herein "POST
Director") of the Peace Officer Standards and Training Council (herein "POST Council").
Any reference herein to POST shall be inclusive of the POST Director, the POST
Council and the Administrative Law Judge appointed by the POST Council to conduct the
evidentiary hearing that was held below.

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Is POST estopped from taking any adverse action against Mr. Benson's

peace officer certification after it issued the same and he then worked as a peace officer
for almost three (3) years? This issue was preserved below at R. 316-317, R. 344-348, R.
740, R. 738 at p. 8-9.
Standard of Review: The standard of review on this issue is a "fair degree of
deference" because it involves a mixed question of whether the requirements of the law
of estoppel have been satisfied under the facts. See, State v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 678
(Utah 1997).
2.

Did the POST Director's Final Order exceed the limited and narrow

decision of the POST Council in violation of POST Administrative Rule 728-40920(1)(2008)? This issue was preserved below at R. 844-846.
Standard of Review: The standard of review on this issue is correction of error
because it involves a question of law. See. Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 795
P.2d 671, 674 (Utah Ct.App. 1990); Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23,
27 (Utah CtApp. 1991).
3.

Did POST commit reversible error when it failed/refused to rule on Mr.

Benson's disparate treatment legal argument? This issue was preserved below at R. 330,
R. 1170, R. 1177.
Standard of Review: The standard of review on this issue is correction of error.
See, Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 27-28 (Utah Ct.App. 1991).

2

4.

Did POST abuse its discretion and/or act contrary to its past practice by

ignoring Mr. Benson's successful passing of the statutory waiver examination, which
thereby cured any alleged lapsing of Mr. Benson's continued peace officer certification?
This issue was preserved below at R. 317, R. 740, R. 1170, R. 1177.
Standard of Review: The standard of review on this issue is abuse of discretion
with some deference because it involves a mixed question of fact and law. See, Trolley
Square Associates v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah Ct.App. 1994); Tolman v. Salt Lake
County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 27 (Utah Ct.App. 1991).
5.

Did the POST Director erroneously adopt Findings of Fact, Conclusions of

Law and Recommended Decision that are not supported by a preponderance of the
evidence in the record of the proceedings held before the POST'S Administrative Law
Judge? This issue was preserved below at R. 339, 739-740.
Standard of Review: Although most administrative proceedings are usually
subject to a substantial evidence burden of proof standard, the POST Council has adopted
a higher burden of proof standard applicable to its administrative proceedings, to-wit:
preponderance of the evidence. See, POST Administrative Rule 728-409-7(c)(2008).
Challenges to factual findings will be reviewed for clear error after giving deference to
the POST Council's findings. See, Handy v. U.S. Bank, Nat. Ass'n. 2008 UT App 9, TJ12,
177 P.3d 80; Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 27 (Utah Ct.App. 1991).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
Pursuant to Rules 24(a)(6) and 24(a)(l 1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
3

Procedure, Mr. Benson submits that the following constitutional provisions, statutes, rules
and policies are applicable to the case on appeal and the same are attached hereto in the
Addendum at Exhibits R through Z.
1.

Constitutional provisions:
a.
b.

2.

United States Constitution, Amendment 14, Section 1.
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 7.

Statutes:
a.
b.
c.
d.

3.

Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-201, et. seq. (1995)
Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-211(4) (1998)
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-205 (2008)
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(h)(iii) (2008)

Rules:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g-

POST Rule 728-406-1, et. seq. (2008)
POST Rule 728-407-1 (2008)
POST Rule 728-407-2 (2008)
POST Rule 728-409-7 (2008)
POST Rule 728-409-12 (2008)
POST Rule 728-409-16 (2008)
POST Rule 728-409-20(1) (2008)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1

A.

CASE NATURE, COURSE, PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION
1.

Nature of the Case; It is undisputed that Mr. Benson has been an

exemplary peace officer for almost twenty-five (25) years. R. 326 (finding no. 15); R.
542-574; R. 737 at p. 65-66, 77-78. 265, 288, 294-295; R. 738 at p. 18. In fact, Mr.
Benson initially retired after a successful twenty (20) year career as a peace officer with
1. Attached as Exhibits A-Q to the Addendum are highlighted copies of the pertinent
Exhibits, Transcripts, Minutes and Orders.
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the Utah Department of Corrections in 1998. R. 738 at p. 14. In 1998, Mr. Benson
accepted a peace officer position as an investigator for the Insurance Fraud Division
while he continued to work with his prior confidential informants as a reserve officer for
the Utah Department of Corrections. R. 737 at p. 6-8. In January of 2000, Mr. Benson
resigned from the Department of Insurance to accept employment in the private sector.
R. 737 at p. 38, 1170. Mr. Benson's record of fine service to law enforcement is not
disputed by POST. R. 738 at p. 18, Ins. 9-14. Mr. Benson was re-hired by the Utah
Department of Corrections in March of 2004, however, due to the gap in Mr. Benson's
employment with the State, an issue surfaced in late 2004/early 2005 regarding whether
his peace officer certification had lapsed.

2. In 2005, Mr. Benson was instructed by the Utah Department of Corrections Director
Scott Carver to take the statutory re-certification examination authorized under Utah Code
Ann. § 53-6-206 (1993). R.738 at p. 16-17. Although Mr. Benson promptly filled out all
of the required paperwork, he was told by Lt. Jim Keith at the POST Council that retaking the exam was not necessary at the time and that his certification would be
"reactived" if he submitted his training hours for 2004. R.738 at p. 16-17. See, Exhibit G
set forth in the Addendum. Mr. Benson submitted his training hours and POST issued a
letter on April 26, 2005, confirming/"reactivating" Mr. Benson's peace officer
certification. R. 540, 686-689. See, Exhibit I set forth in the Addendum. In response to
a Legislative Audit in 2006, the Utah Department of Corrections instructed Mr. Benson to
again requested he take the re-certification examination. R.738 at p. 17. Mr. Benson
contacted POST and was permitted to take the examination and subsequently passed the
same. R.738 at p. 17.
Despite Mr. Benson having had his certification "reactivated" in 2005 and thereafter
passing the statutory re-certification examination in January of 2007, POST issued an
Administrative Complaint in May of 2007 seeking to "refuse" his peace officer
certification. Because POST has a prior history of accepting statutory waiver
examinations in lieu of requiring former peace officers to attend any additional retraining, Mr. Benson asserts that POST is denying him the same opportunity - which is a
violation of his due process - and POST'S action therefore amounts to "an abuse of
discretion." See, Lunnen v. Utah Dep't of Transportation, 886 P.2d 70, 73-74 (Utah
Ct.App. 1994). Additionally, POST abused its discretion in failing to accept Mr.
5

2.

Course of the Proceedings Below: On May 10, 2007, POST issued an

Administrative Complaint seeking to refuse3 Mr. Benson's peace officer certification
based on allegations4 concerning two factual issues: 1) whether Mr. Benson's peace
officer certification had lapsed ostensibly because he had not fully complied with the
reserve officer policies5 of the Utah Department of Corrections; and 2) whether Mr.

Benson's passing score on the statutory waiver examination curing any alleged
certification deficiencies because it clearly and unequivocally demonstrated that Mr.
Benson has always been duly qualified to act as a peace officer.
3. Mr. Benson submits POST'S Administrative Complaint presents a factual/legal non
sequitur: At a minimum, POST "reactivated" Mr. Benson's peace officer certification in
2005 and POST could not, therefore, "refuse" Mr. Benson's peace officer certification in
2007 because the same had already been issued/granted. In this context, Mr. Benson
submits Mr. Benson's peace officer certification means to "deny" his application for
peace officer certification. If you compare the lapsing in Utah Code Ann. §53-6211(1 )(a) ("the council [may] revoke, refuse, or suspend certification...") with the
language in Utah Code Ann. §53-6-211(4) (1998) ("Denial, suspension, or revocation
procedures may not be initiated by the council..."), Mr. Benson submits that "refusal" of
Mr. Benson's peace officer certification is not an available basis for POST to have taken
any action against Mr. Benson's peace officer certification in this case.
4. The POST Administrative Complaint contained two (2) counts, the second of which
was withdrawn by POST. R. 323. Accordingly, only the first count will be addressed
herein.
5. By statutory enactment and administrative rule, the Utah Legislature and POST have
explicitly precluded any adverse action be imposed against any peace officer's
certification for conduct that violates any "individual department policy and procedure."
See, Utah Code Ann § 56-6-211(4) (1998) and R. 728-409-4(B) (2007). By predicating
its "lapse" argument on Mr. Benson's failure to comply with departmental policies,
POST'S case against Mr. Benson is fundamentally flawed because those policy violations
are statutory/administratively unavailable bases for POST to take adverse action against
Mr. Benson's peace officer certification. Moreover, those policy violations did not arise
from any intentional misconduct on Mr. Benson's part but, rather and as found by
Administrative Law Judge Luke below, "an institutionally accepted lax attitude in helping
former employees retain their POST certification." See, Exhibit O set forth in the
Addendum at Findings of Fact No. 14.
6

Benson had allegedly falsified information to obtain certified status in 2004. R. 3-9.
On December 18, 2007, POST Administrative Law Judge Cheryl D. Luke (herein
"ALJ Luke") conducted an evidentiary hearing and issued her proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order (herein "Recommended Order") dated
February 29, 2008.6 R.323-328. In the Recommended Order, ALJ Luke made two-fold
recommendations: first, that Mr. Benson's peace officer certification lapsed in January of
2004; and second, that Mr. Benson willfully provided false information to POST
regarding his reserve officer status. Pursuant to POST Administrative Rule 728-40918(B)(2008), Mr. Benson timely appealed the Recommended Order to the POST Council.
At the POST Council meeting on July 9, 2008, Sheriff Bud Cox made a motion to
"accept Administrative Law Judge's recommendation that Ronald Benson's peace officer
certification lapsed in January of 2004" (emphasis supplied). R. 738 at p. 44-45. Sheriff
Cox's motion passed with 9 votes in favor and 1 vote against. R. 756-757. Significantly,
the POST Council received absolutely no motion whatsoever to accept ALJ Luke's
Recommended Order, in toto, nor to determine whether Mr. Benson allegedly provided
false information to POST. Nevertheless, POST Director Scott Stephenson boldly issued
the POST Final Order dated June 11, 2008, wherein he unilaterally, and without apparent
or express authority from the POST Council, adopted ALJ Luke's Recommended Order,

6. The statutory and administrative rule authority of a POST ALJ is limited to only
making "recommendations" to the POST Council. See, Utah Code Ann. § 53-621 l(l)(c)(1998); R.728-409-16(A)(l)(2008). Hence, unless adopted by the POST
Council, ALJ Luke's Recommended Order has no legal effect because it is a mere
recommendation that does not constitute a binding or final order.
7

in toto,7 so as to include ALJ Luke's determination regarding Mr. Benson's alleged
willful submission of false information to POST.
3.

Disposition Below: Notwithstanding the POST Council's limited decision

in this matter, on June 11, 2008, the POST Director issued a Final Order in which he
incorporated the entire Recommended Order of ALJ Luke as described hereinabove. R.
386-402.
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1998, Mr. Benson retired from a successful twenty (20) year career with Utah

Department of Corrections (herein "DOC"). R. 738 at p. 14; R. 538; R. 578. Incident to
Mr. Benson's retirement, he sought and obtained approval from the DOC to act in a
reserve officer capacity in behalf of the DOC and POST approved his Application for
peace officer certification as a reserve officer on January 19, 1999. R. 473, 474. See,
Exhibit A and B set forth in the Addendum. Subsequently, Mr. Benson obtained
employment through another state agency (the Department of Insurance as a criminal
investigator) but he then resigned in 2000 to pursue employment in the private sector. R.
737 at p. 6, 169-170; R.799.

7. The POST Director's adoption of ALJ Luke's entire Recommended Order is
prejudicial to Mr. Benson, in part, because it is being applied as res judicata in a separate
administrative proceeding before the Utah Career Service Review Board to support the
concurrent termination of his merit employment from the Utah Department of
Corrections, to-wit: Mr. Benson's merit employment was terminated on May 30, 2008,
which means that the two (2) administrative decisions were issued only twelve (12) days
apart. R. 989. Mr. Benson has submitted to POST a Motion to Stay the Final Order that
has been denied. Mr. Benson anticipates he will be filing a Motion for Stay with this
Court in the near future.
8

During Mr. Benson's private sector employment, he subjectively believed he had
concurrently maintained his status as a reserve officer with the DOC. R.737 at p. 20-23.
Significantly, Mr. Benson continued to meet his annual peace officer training requirement
during this time period.8 Accordingly, when Mr. Benson decided to pursue reemployment in a peace officer position with the DOC in 2003, he sought confirmation
from POST regarding the status of his peace officer certification. R. 737 at p. 15-16.
Incident thereto, Mr. Benson was informed by Jayme Garn (POST Technician) that
his certification appeared to be active.9 In fact, Ms. Gam relayed to Mr. Benson that
POST'S records reflected that he was currently (as of 2003) employed with the DOC. R.
737 at p. 28. Mr. Benson informed Ms. Garn, however, that she was mistaken because
Mr. Benson had been a reserve officer for the DOC since 1998. R. 737 at p. 28-29. Ms.
Gam then informed Mr. Benson that she would need documentation from the DOC
reflecting his status. R. 737 at p. 15-16.
In response to Ms. Gam's request, Mr. Benson contacted Leo Lucey who was Mr.

8. POST'S records demonstrate that Mr. Benson had completed his required annual
training for each year in question (from 2000-2004) and was properly certified as of
March 29, 2006 R 577-578 (See, Exhibit J set forth in the Addendum); R 737 at p 128130. Had Mr. Benson wanted to permit his reserve officer status to lapse, he obviously
would not have continued his forty (40) plus hours of annual training in 2000, 2002 and
2003.
9. Significantly, since POST'S records showed his certification was active, had Mr.
Benson wanted to engage in falsification of records, he could have simply thanked Ms.
Gam for the information and not said anything to correct the error in POST'S records.
Instead, Mr. Benson immediately corrected Ms. Gam and took steps to correct the error in
POST'S records. Thus, Mr. Benson's actions are inconsistent and contrary to POST'S
allegations that he "willfully" falsified any information.
9

Benson's former supervisor at the time he retired from the DOC in 1998 and had signed
Mr. Benson's original application to hold peace officer certification as a reserve officer.
R. 737 at p. 15. See, Exhibit A set forth in the Addendum. Mr. Lucey indeed testified
that he recalled Mr. Benson filling out a "reserve officer packet" and he believed Mr.
Benson had apparently acted in a reserve officer capacity for the DOC since Mr. Benson
left employment with the State of Utah, Insurance Fraud Division in 2000. R. 737 at 169,
172-176. Mr. Benson then requested that Mr. Lucey contact Ms. Garn and find out what
information Ms. Gam believed to be necessary to address her concerns. R. 737 at p. 2730? 173; R. 1170 -1171. Accordingly, Mr. Lucey called Ms. Gam who then explained
that POST needed verification of the information he had regarding Mr. Benson's reserve
officer status. R. 737 at p. 171-174. In response thereto and on or about September 18,
2003, Mr. Lucey sent Ms. Gam a memo outlining the fact that he believed Mr. Benson
had filled out a reserve officer packet10 with the DOC.11 R. 737 at p. 172-176.

10. Upon request from Lt. Steven Winward, POST Investigator, Mr. Benson submitted
evidence to POST demonstrating that he had, in fact, submitted a Reserve Officer
Application Packet dated February 9, 2000, to the DOC as referenced in Leo Lucey's
memo, of September of 2003. R. 517-520. Significantly, POST'S "Employee Profile"
dated March 29, 2006. reflects that Mr. Benson's certification was effective on the same
date as his Reserve Officer Application Packet. See, Exhibit J set forth in the Addendum.
Inasmuch as Lt. Winward testified he did not receive Mr. Benson's Reserve Officer
Application Packet until January 26, 2007, Mr. Benson submits that POST had this
information well before it began making allegations of willful falsification because there
is no record testimony explaining why POST'S files reflecting the February 9, 2000,
effective date. R. 517-520.
11. The Leo Lucey memo (See, Exhibit C set forth in the Addendum) was the
centerpiece of evidence relied on by POST counsel at the evidentiary hearing before ALJ
Luke to establish that Mr. Benson allegedly submitted false records to POST. R. 481; R.
10

Ms. Garn issued a letter dated October 1, 2003, indicating that Mr. Benson was
"certifiable" (not certified) as a peace officer as of October 1, 2003. R. 475. See, Exhibit
D set forth in the Addendum. Significantly, this time period is within the four (4) year
window contemplated by Utah Code Ann § 53-6-208(2)(b) (1993) and therefore
accurately reflects Mr. Benson's status at that time even in the absence of Leo Lucey's
memo.
In February of 2004, the DOC offered Mr. Benson employment as a peace officer.
R. 539. Before hiring Mr. Benson in a certified peace officer position, the DOC
requested POST to confirm Mr. Benson's peace officer certification status under cover
letter from Inga Bowen to Rick Phipps dated February 10, 2004, regarding Mr. Benson's
anticipated acceptance of employment with the DOC. R. 539. See, Exhibit E set forth in
the Addendum.
In 2005, Mr. Benson was considered for a promotion. Incident thereto, a question
was raised by other DOC personnel and a labor union as to the status of Mr. Benson's

700. However, the record testimony is clear - Mr. Benson did not write/submit the memo
to POST - Mr. Lucey submitted his memo directly to Ms. Garn after speaking with Ms.
Gam and without further dialogue with Mr. Benson regarding the same and that Mr.
Benson did not request him to draft the memo in any fashion. R. 737 at p. 176-177.
Additionally, the memo merely indicated that Mr. Benson filled out a reserve officer
packet, not that Mr. Benson, in fact, met any technical requirements required by the
policies of the DOC. R. 481. Simply stated, Mr. Benson did not participate in the
drafting of the memo by Mr. Lucey and Mr. Benson did not falsify any documentation
that was submitted to POST by Mr. Lucey - willfully or otherwise - and POST presented
no evidence to the contrary in the proceedings below.
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peace officer certification.

To address any perceived concern with DOC personnel, on

March 15, 2005, Mr. Benson was directed by DOC Executive Director Scott Carver to
apply and take the statutory waiver examination. R. 737 at p. 262-267; R. 692-698 (See,
Exhibit F set forth in the Addendum). Then POST In-Service Director, Lt. Jim Keith
reviewed Mr. Benson's application and determined that the statutory waiver examination
was unnecessary, and that all Mr. Benson needed to do to reactivate his peace officer
certification was to submit his ten (10) hours of training records for 2004. R. 737 at p.
195-203; R. 476 (See, Exhibit G set forth in the Addendum). On April 5, 2005, Lt. Keith
sent a letter to Larry Evans (at the DOC) outlining the steps Mr. Benson needed to take to
reactivate his peace officer certification. See, Exhibit G set forth in the Addendum.
In response to Lt. Keith's April 5, 2005, letter, Mr. Benson sent a fax (on April 26,
2005) to POST technician Letisha Shelby containing his training hours accompanied by
an Application for Training Credit. R. 686-689. See, Exhibit H set forth in the
Addendum. Significantly, Lt. Keith testified that his initials, date and "OK" in fact
appear on the top right hand corner of Exhibit H. R. 737 at p. 201; See, Exhibit H set
forth in the Addendum. Upon receiving, reviewing and approving Mr. Benson's 2004

12. Mike Hanks, Director of Law Enforcement for DOC (in charge of Internal Affairs
and employee investigations), testified that he received a few phone calls with complaints
regarding Mr. Benson's peace officer status, one of which was from the Fraternal Order
of Police. R. 737 at p. 46-49. Mr. Hanks testified that in his discussions with Scott
Carver (Executive Director of DOC) and Joe Borich (Director of AP&P for DOC), both
Mr. Carver and Mr. Borich informed him that Mr. Benson was going to take the statutory
waiver examination. R. 737 at p. 46-49. Mr. Hanks agreed that Mr. Benson's taking of
the statutory waiver examination would resolve the problem. Although Mr. Hanks retired
shortly after these discussions, Mr. Hanks offered his personal opinion that he believed
12

training hours, Lt. Keith directed POST Technician Letisha Shelby to immediately issue a
letter dated April 26, 2005, confirming Mr. Benson's peace officer certification was
effective as of March 4, 2004 - the date referenced in Inga Bowen's letter of February 20,
2004. R. 540. See, Exhibit I set forth in the Addendum. R. 737 at p. 202. On August
31, 2005, Mr. Benson was formally promoted incident to his exemplary performance with
the DOC. R. 573; R. 707.
In late 2006, Mr. Benson's peace officer certification was one of the topics
considered by employees of the Legislative Auditors' Office who were conducting an
audit of the DOC. R. 733 at p. 89-90, 130-134; R. 579-675. In order to address any
concerns, Mr. Benson was again directed by DOC Executive Director Scott Carver to
submit an application to take the statutory waiver examination as provided by Utah Code
Ann. § 53-6-208 (2)(b) (1993) and Mr. Benson submitted his application on or about
January 9, 2007, and then successfully passed the statutory waiver examination. R. 737 at
p. 109. It is undisputed that POST had processed the foregoing application. See, Exhibit
K set forth in the Addendum. Notwithstanding Mr. Benson's successful passing of the
statutory waiver examination. Lt. Winward testified that POST initiated its investigation
on January 30, 2007, at the request of the DOC. R. 737 at p. 112-113; R. 527. See,
Exhibit L set forth in the Addendum. Further, the POST Council elected to pursue an
administrative complaint against Mr. Benson's peace officer certification in which it
subsequently alleged that Mr. Lucey's letter to Ms. Garn allegedly constituted willful

Mr. Benson was willing to take the statutory waiver examination. R. 737 at p. 49.
13

falsification such that the POST Council then had authority to "refuse" Mr. Benson's
peace officer certification even though POST had "reactivated" his peace officer
certification as recently as April 26, 2005. R. 3-9. Significantly, the POST Council has
never pursued any action against Mr. Lucey's peace officer certification - in fact, Mr.
Lucey is currently employed with the Office of the Utah Attorney General.
In his investigation, Lt. Steven Winward specifically found that:
"The issue of falsification of documentation to obtain peace
officer status is undetermined. Based on the information
gathered and individuals I contacted it is difficult to determine
if the memo produced by Leo Lucey in September of 2003
was done under false pretenses." (Emphasis supplied). R.
526-533. See, Exhibit L set forth in the Addendum.
In essence, Lt. Winward's investigation did not make a determination that Mr.
Benson had ever engaged in any falsification (willful or otherwise) to POST to obtain his
peace officer status. R. 526-533; R. 737 at p. 108-112. Thus, Lt. Winward did not find
that Mr. Benson had engaged in any misconduct that warrant action being taken against
Mr. Benson's certification.
Count I in the Administrative Complaint issued by POST contains the following
four (4) violations of statute/rule allegedly committed by Mr. Benson:
"As provided in the following paragraphs, Ronald W. Benson
is alleged to have committed the acts enumerated below,
which are in violation of [i] Utah Code § 53-6-211(1 )(d)(i)
willful falsification of any information to obtain certified
status; [ii] Utah Administrative Code R728-409-3(A),
willfully providing both written and verbal information that
was false in order to obtain certified status; [iii] Utah Code §
53-6-21 l(l)(d)(v) conduct or pattern of conduct that would
tend to disrupt, diminish or otherwise jeopardize public trust

1 A

and fidelity in law enforcement; [iv] Utah Administrative
Code R728-409-3(J)(l)(i) commission of an act which
violates the peace officer's oath of office; and violation of the
Law Enforcement Code of Ethics." (Emphasis and bracketing
supplied). R.5.
Only evidence regarding the first two alleged violations - willful falsification or
willfully providing written and verbal false information - were presented to ALJ Luke by
POST. R. 889. The pertinent factual allegations set forth in the Administrative
Complaint are as follows:
"8. Ronald W. Benson claimed to have worked as a reserve
officer for the Department of Corrections during the period
between January 1, 2000 and March 2004 and provided
documentation to POST indicated that he was working as a
reserve officer during this four-year period....
9. Ronald W. Benson was not employed by the Department of
Corrections as a reserve officer during the period between
January 1, 2000 and March 2004....
10. Ronald W. Benson willfully13 provided false information
to POST in an effort to obtain certified peace officer status
and to prevent his peace officer certification from lapsing,
pursuant to §53-6-208(2)(a)." (Emphasis supplied). R. 5.
Despite having made allegations of willful misconduct in paragraph 10 of POST'S
Administrative Complaint, POST then relied upon a lesser negligence14 standard (knew or

13. As the italicized language in paragraph 10 of POST'S Administrative Complaint
alleges, POST must prove something more than mere negligent misconduct in order to
"refuse" one's peace officer certification.
14. The "willful falsification" standard contained in Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-21 l(l)(d)(i)
(1998) is analogous to the willful misconduct language contained in Utah's former
"guest" statute that precluded passengers in automobiles from pursuing personal injury
claims against the driver of the vehicle unless the driver was intoxicated or engaged in
is;

should have known) in Count I therein:
"Ronald W. Benson met with POST and provided both verbal
and written information in an effort to obtain certified status
that indicated that he had been working as a reserve law
enforcement officer for the Department of Corrections during
the four-year period of time between January 2000 and March
2004. Ronald W. Benson knew15 or should have known16 that
the information that was provided to POST was false."
(Emphasis supplied). R. 5.
It is undisputed that Mr. Benson has been an excellent employee with the DOC
over his twenty-two (22) plus years of service with the DOC as a certified peace officer.
R. 542-574, 338-380; R. 738 at p. 18. Even ALJ Luke acknowledged Mr. Benson has
ably and capably performed his duties as a peace officer. See, Findings of Fact No. 15 at
R. 326; See, Exhibit O set forth in the Addendum; See, R. 737 at p. 288. Inexplicably,
ALJ Luke declined to review Mr. Benson's annual performance evaluations and, instead,
requested that Mr. Benson present this information to the POST Council. R. 737 at p.

willful misconduct. Some 56 years ago, the Utah Supreme Court held that such "willful
misconduct" required providing that the driver engaged in an intentional act/omission and
not mere negligence. See, Ricciati v. Robinson, 2 Utah 2d 45, 47, 269 P.2d 282, 283
(1954).
15. There is no record evidence that Mr. Benson knew he was not a reserve officer under
departmental policies. In fact, Mr. Benson was indisputably certified by POST as a
reserve officer in 1998, continually maintained his training hours between 2000-2004,
and worked with confidential informants during this time period such that Mr. Benson
believed he was acting as a reserve officer. R. 737 at p. 5-9, 11-14, 20, 38-39; R. 473474; R. 577-579.
16. The "should have known" standard cannot, by definition, meet the willful standard
required by Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-21 l(l)(d)(i) and as alleged in Count 1 of POST'S
Administrative Complaint.
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287-289. Mr. Benson presented evidence of his exemplary performance history to the
POST Council. R. 738 at p. 12; R. 338-385.
IV
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I: Assuming, arguendo, POST had statutory authority to adjudicate
whether Mr. Benson's peace officer certification had lapsed due to his prior noncompliance with DOC policies, POST is nevertheless estopped from taking any adverse
action against Mr. Benson's peace officer certificate because any violation of DOC
policies does not constitute a statutory basis upon which POST may take any adverse
action and Mr. Benson had relied upon POST'S action incident to performing his peace
officer duties at the DOC for almost three (3) years.
POINT II: On February 28, 2008, POST Administrative Law Judge Cheryl Luke
(herein "ALJ Luke") issued her Recommended Order containing two-fold findings and
recommendations: first, that Mr. Benson's certification lapsed in January of 2004; and
second, that Mr. Benson submitted falsified records to POST to obtain Peace Officer
certification. On June 11, 2008, the POST Council did not adopt both aspects of ALJ
Luke's Recommended Order, but instead determined only that Mr. Benson's peace officer
certification had lapsed in January of 2004. R. 756-757. Significantly, the POST Council
did not make any decision or determination that any allegation of fraud on the part of Mr.
Benson or Mr. Lucey would be sustained or included as part of the Final Order of the
POST Council. R. 756-757.
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The minutes of the POST Council Meetings held on June 9, 2008/ demonstrate
that the only motion made and approved by POST Council was simply that Mr. Benson's
peace officer certification had lapsed and nothing more. R. 757. More importantly, ALJ
Luke's vague and non-specific Finding of Fact No. 16 (regarding alleged falsification of
records) was not approved or adopted by the POST Council. Moreover, since ALJ
Luke's Finding of Fact No. 16 was a mere non-binding recommendation to the POST
Council18 that was not adopted/approved by the POST Council as reflected by the POST
Minutes, POST Director Stephenson's Final Order adopting ALJ Luke's Findings of Fact,
in toto, and inclusive of Finding of Fact No. 16, in his "Final Order" dated June 11, 2008,
was beyond the scope of his authority19 and must be reversed.
POINT III: The POST Council committed reversible error and deprived Mr.
Benson of his constitutional right to due process when it failed/refused to rule on Mr.
Benson's disparate treatment argument. Under UAPA, the Appellate Court has
jurisdiction to reverse an administrative agency's decision where the agency has not
decided all of the pertinent issues before it. See, §63G-4-403(4)(c) (2008). In Mr.
Benson's Answer to the Administrative Complaint, Mr. Benson properly and timely
raised the argument of consistency of discipline vis-a-vis Mr. Lucey who wrote the memo

17. R. 756-757, 799-800. See, highlighted copies of the pertinent portions of the POST
Council Minutes dated June 9, 2008, attached as Exhibit M to the Addendum. In the
September 11, 2008, Minutes, the June 9, 2008, Minutes were approved without any
pertinent revisions. R. 804.
18. See, POST Rule 728-409-16(A)(1) (2008).
19. See, POST Rule 728-409-20(A)(l) (2008).
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that is the only piece of written documentation POST relies in support of its fraudulent
information argument. See, Exhibit C set forth in the Addendum. R. 739-743. Although
in the DOC's Request for Investigation it sought investigation of both Mr. Lucey and Mr.
Benson, only Mr. Benson's POST'S certification was the subject of adverse action by the
POST Council. R. 535.
Mr. Benson also raised in his Answer to the Administrative Complaint the
disparate treatment of other peace officers, such as Mike Hanks, who were allowed to
take the statutory waiver examination after more than four (4) years away from the
sendee. However, when Mr. Benson applied to take the statutory waiver examination in
2005 he was told it was unnecessary and when he again applied in 2007 and took and
passed the examination, POST'S failure to accept the statutory waiver examination and
maintain Mr. Benson's peace officer certification thus constitute disparate treatment.
Both ALJ Luke and POST Council failed/refused to rule on Mr. Benson's disparate
treatment argument. Mr. Benson's counsel addressed this issue during the Motion for
Directed Verdict which ALJ Luke took under advisement and never ruled on. R. 737 at
p. 254, 260. Mr. Benson renewed his disparate treatment argument in both his written
submission to POST Council as well during the POST Council meeting. R. 738 at p. 812; R. 344-348. However, to date neither ALJ Luke nor POST Council have issued any
recommendation or order regarding Mr. Benson's disparate treatment.
POINT IV: POST abused its discretion and violated Mr. Benson's right to due
process when it failed to give validity to Mr. Benson's application and subsequent passing
of POST'S re-certification statutory waiver examination. The POST Council has adopted
a waiver process as "an avenue for individuals who have met prescribed training

19

standards to become certified as Utah law enforcement officers." POST Rule 728-407-1
(2008). Through this process, peace officers who have let their certification lapse may
become re-certified by submitting an application and successfully passing a POST
statutory waiver examination.20 POST Rule 728-407-2 (2008). Moreover, on at least two
(2) occasions after the submission of the Leo Lucey memo, Mr. Benson was willing to
take the POST statutory waiver examination and POST personnel determined it was
unnecessary for Mr. Benson to do so. R. 738 at p. 16-17.
In 2005, Mr. Benson was asked by the DOC Director Scott Carver to take the recertification examination. R.738 at p. 16-17. Although Mr. Benson promptly filled out
all of the paperwork required, he was told by POST personnel - Lt. Jim Keith, then POST
In-Service Bureau Chief, that re-taking the examination was not necessary, all Mr.
Benson needed to do was complete ten (10) hours of training and his peace officer
certification would be active - Mr. Benson complied with Lt. Keith's direction. R.738 at
p. 16-17. In response to a Legislative audit, Mr. Carver approached Mr. Benson again in

20. Although the administrative rule requires the statutory waiver examination to be
taken within four (4) years of being retired from active duty, POST did not request Mr.
Benson take the exam in October 2003. Furthermore, POST had a history of allowing
applicants to take the statutory waiver examination for the purpose of re-certification after
as many as seven (7) years of inactivity as demonstrated by testimony of Mike Hanks in
the proceedings below. R.737 at p. 53-54. Thus, POST'S inconsistent application of the
rule, allowing some peace officers to take the exam after four (4) years, while denying the
same opportunity to other applicants, constitutes a denial of Mr. Benson's right to due
process and constitutes an inconsistent prior practice that warrants reversal under §63G-4403(4)(h)(iii) (2008). See, Lunnen v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 886 P.2d 70, 73-74 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994) (finding agency's inconsistent application in applying an administrative
rule could be a violation of notice and due process).

on

late 2006, and directed him to take the statutory waiver examination. R.738 at p. 17. Mr.
Benson did so at this time, subsequently passing the examination. R.738 at p. 17.
Because POST had a history of accepting statutory waiver examinations in lieu of
requiring former peace officers to go through additional training, denying Mr. Benson of
this same opportunity was a violation of Benson's due process rights and POST'S action
therefore amounts to "an abuse of discretion." See, Lunnen at 73-74. Further, POST
abused its discretion in failing to accept Mr. Benson's successful passing of the statutory
waiver examination as a cure to any certification deficiencies.
POINT V:

Mr. Benson believed he was acting in a reserve officer capacity.

Although Mr. Benson may (after the fact) have been found to have violated the internal
policies of the DOC, Mr. Benson's alleged violation of DOC policies, POST does not
have statutory authority to take any adverse action against Mr. Benson's peace officer
status as a result (Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-211(4)( 1998)). Mr. Benson honestly believed
he was a reserve officer at the time of his POST certification during the 2003/2004 time
period because: (1) his reserve officer certification was issued in 1998 and was never
rescinded;21 (2) he performed the reserve duties as they were explained to and requested
of him by the DOC at the time;22 and (3), the Legislative Audit confirms that the DOC's
reserve officer policies, i.e. have a supervisor, receive a monthly stipend, etc. were not

21. R. 737 at p. 20-21, 120; R. 474; See, Exhibit B set forth in the Addendum.
22. R. 737 at p. 23-24, 214.
21

being followed by the DOC - if this was going on department wide, then how was Mr.
Benson suppose to know anything else was expected? Thus, POST failed to demonstrate
a prima facie case of willful falsification.
In October of 2003, there were two ways that Mr. Benson could become certified either by taking the statutory waiver examination, which he was eligible to do (without
needing approval from the Director of POST), or by providing documentation that he was
a reserve officer. R. 737 at p. 137-138. Mr. Benson was always ready willing and able to
take the statutory waiver examination, which he easily passed. R. 737 at p. 109, 288. If
Mr. Benson had been told by POST to take the statutory waiver examination in 2004, he
would have done so. R. 737 at p. 288. Thus, there was no motivation or reason for Mr.
Benson to "falsify" records.
There was no evidence presented during the twenty-five (25) years that he was
employed as a peace officer that Mr. Benson was anything other than an exemplary cop the evidence was uncontroverted that Mr. Benson was a fine peace officer who was well
respected in the law enforcement community. R. 326 (finding no. 15); R. 542-574; R.
737 at p. 65-66, 77-78. 265, 288, 294-295; R. 738 at p. 18. Mr. Benson respectfully
submits that in this circumstance, the "refusal" of his peace officer certification, and
further the allegation that he committed willful falsification of records regarding his
peace officer certification is a grave injustice that cannot be permitted to stand and must
be reversed.

23. R. 579-685.
22

ARGUMENT
I
BY GRANTING PEACE OFFICER
CERTIFICATION STATUS TO MR. BENSON
PRIOR TO THE FILING OF POST'S COMPLAINT,
POST IS ESTOPPED FROM SUBSEQUENTLY
SEEKING TO "REFUSE" HIS EXISTING PEACE
OFFICER CERTIFICATION
In the prayer for relief in POST'S Administrative Complaint (POST'S Complaint)
in this matter, POST did not seek to revoke or suspend24 Mr. Benson's theretofore issued
peace officer certification but, rather, sought a refusal

of the same, to-wit:

"WHEREFORE Steven C. Winward, Certification Bureau
Chief, Peace Officer Standards and Training, hereby request
the REFUSAL of Ronald W. Benson's request for peace
officer certification." (Bold/italics in original).
Having issued and subsequently "reactivated" Mr. Benson's certification over a
time period covering three (3) years (from 2004-2007), Mr. Benson submits POST is
equitably estopped from subsequently refusing/denying Mr. Benson the peace officer
certification issued to him in accordance with the elements of equitable estoppel:
"The elements essential to invoke equitable estoppel are: (1) a
statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party
24. As an apparent strategic decision, POST did not seek revocation or suspension of Mr.
Benson's certification.
25. POST'S Complaint is unclear as to the effective date it sought to obtain a "refusal" in
light of POST having previously granted reserve peace officer certification status to Mr.
Benson in 1998 (See, Exhibit B set forth in the Addendum), which was reaffirmed in
October of 2003 and "reactivated" in April of 2005 (See, Exhibit D set forth in the
Addendum). Mr. Benson's certification has never been revoked or suspended by POST
as evidenced by the POST Profile dated March 29, 2006 (See, Exhibit J set forth in the
Addendum).
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inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (2) reasonable action
or inaction by the other party taken on the basis of the first
party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (3)
injury to the second party that would result from allowing the
first party to contradict or repudiate such statement,
admission, act, or failure to act. CECO Corp. v. Concrete
Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Utah 1989); Celebrity
Club, 602 P.2d at 694; Utah Dep 't of Transp. v. Reagan
Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 751 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah Ct. App.
1988)." Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Board, 795 P.2d
671, 675 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).26
Mr. Benson submits the doctrine of equitable estoppel warrants reversal of POST'S
Final Order because Mr. Benson can demonstrate his case is encompassed within the
elements of equitable estoppel. First, on two (2) separate occasions and spanning
approximately three (3) years prior to the filing of POST'S Complaint herein, Mr. Benson
submits that Exhibits B, D and I in the Addendum demonstrate POST has taken actions

26. As a general rule, the Utah Courts have held that equitable estoppel may be invoked
against the State where it is in the interests of justice to do so, to-wit:
"As a general rule under case law, the doctrine of estoppel is not assertable
against the state and its agencies. Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d
715, 718 (Utah 1982). Utah courts have, however, carved out an exception
to this general common law rule in unusual circumstances "where it is plain
that the interest of justice so require." Id. at 720; see, e.g., Celebrity Club,
Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm 'n, 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979). "In cases
where such an issue arises, the critical inquiry is whether it appears that the
facts may be found with such certainty, and the injustice to be suffered is of
sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception." Utah State Univ., 646 P.2d at
720." Id. (Emphasis supplied).
The case at bar is analogous to the Eldredge case in that the current case
involves a state agency (i.e. POST) that has made a formal written statement (i.e.
peace officer certification) to an individual (i.e. Mr. Benson) and the agency
(POST) now seeks to repudiate/withdraw its prior certification/statement.

94

that are inconsistent with the relief sought in POST'S Complaint (i.e. POST determined
Mr. Benson was appropriately certified as a peace officer and now sought to withdraw
Mr. Benson's certification after the fact). Second, Mr. Benson and the DOC relied on
POST'S prior issuance of peace officer certification to Mr. Benson to initially extend an
offer of employment and to thereafter promote Mr. Benson while he was employed with
the DOC. And third, it would be unjust to permit POST to, sub silentio,
withdraw/repudiate its prior issuance/reactivation of Mr. Benson's peace officer
certification when he has not engaged in any conduct that bears on his fitness to perform
his duties as a peace officer. That Mr. Benson is an exemplary peace officer is not in
dispute and POST should not be permitted to effectively now issue a nunc pro tunc
retraction of its prior issuance of peace officer certification to Mr. Benson absent
statutory authority to do so.
Because it is clear from the Minutes of the POST Council's meeting of June 9,
2008, that the POST Council did not make a finding that Mr. Benson engaged in willful
falsification of information and limited its determination to finding Mr. Benson's
certification had lapsed,27 POST should be equitably estopped from "reneging" on its
prior issuance of peace officer certification to Mr. Benson. To hold otherwise is to
unfairly tarnish Mr. Benson's exemplary career of public service to the citizens of the
State of Utah - a grave injustice.

27. See, R. 757 and R. 800. A detailed discussion on this issue is set forth in Argument
II.
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POST DIRECTOR STEPHENSON'S FINAL ORDER
WAS WITHOUT LAWFUL AUTHORITY BECAUSE
IT WAS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE POST
COUNCIL DECISION.
A.

POST Director Stephenson's "Final Order/'
Under POST Administrative Rule R. 728-409-20(a), the POST Director is

authorized to issue final orders based solely upon the POST Council's decision, to-wit:
"R. 728-409-20. Director's Final Order.
A. In adjudicative proceedings:
1. After a majority of the council recommends to
refuse, suspend or revoke respondent's peace
officer, correctional officer, reserve/auxiliary
officer, or special function officer certification,
or to take no action against respondent, the
director shall prepare and issue a final order
within 30 days outlining the council's decision."
(Emphasis supplied).
The POST Director thus does not have authority to act outside the scope of POST
Council's decision. However, the Final Order that was issued by the POST Director on
June 11, 2008, did not "outline" the POST Council's limited and narrow decision as
required by POST Rule 728-409-20(A)(l) (2008) but, instead, improperly and illegally
adopts, carte blanche, the Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and Recommended
Decision of ALJ Luke. R. 386-402. The POST Council Minutes clearly demonstrate that
the POST Council did not adopt or approve ALJ Luke's Recommended Order as reflected
in the "Final Order" but, instead, adopted the very limited and narrow determination that
Mr. Benson's peace officer certification had merely lapsed in January of 2004. R. 756757,799-800.

2fi

B.

POST Council Meeting and Minutes.
The POST Minutes constitute the official record of the POST Council Decision.

The POST Minutes are controlling because the POST Council is a statutorily created
public body28 that is subject to the requirements contained in Open Public Meeting Act
(herein "the OPMA").29 In the OPMA, the Legislature has mandated that the POST
Minutes constitute the "official record of action taken" at the July 9, 2008, POST Council
meeting, to-wit:
"52-4-203. Minutes of open meetings - Public records Recordings of meetings....
(7) Written minutes and recordings of open meetings are
public records under Title 63G, Chapter 2, Government
Records Access and Management Act, but written minutes
shall be the official record of action taken at the meeting,"
Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-203 (7) (2008)30 (emphasis supplied)
The POST Minutes specifically identify that there were two (2) issues for the
POST Council to determine in Mr. Benson's case: (1) whether Mr. Benson had allegedly
falsified information to obtain certified status; and (2) whether his peace officer
certification had lapsed. R. 756. However, the motion made by Sheriff Bud Cox only
approved ALJ Luke's determination the allegation that Mr. Benson's certification had

28. See, Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-106 (2003).
29. See, Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-103(7)(a)(i) (2007) ("public body means any
administrative, .. .body.. .created by the Utah Constitution, statute, ...").
30. Our Utah Legislature amended the OPMA such that the substantive provisions
regarding the conclusive nature of POST Council's Minutes is now found at Utah Code
Ann. §52-4-203(4)(e) (2009). Mr. Benson's counsel has cited to the statute that was in
effect on June 9, 2008, though the current version appears to be substantively the same.
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lapsed and made no determination regarding the allegations of willful falsification. R.
757.
The POST Council's Minutes clearly reflect that at the Council meeting held on
June 9, 2008, the POST Council did not adopt Ms. Luke's recommended decision, but
rather made a very limited and narrow determination that Mr. Benson's peace officer
certification had merely lapsed as follows:
'There was discussion held by Council members on the
topic of reserve officer status and UDC reserve officer
policy. Bud Cox expressed concern about Benson having
worked for a couple of years in a certified position before
this information was discovered. After reading the ALJ's
findings and facts he made the following motion.
Motion:

Second:
Vote:

Sheriff Bud Cox motioned to accept the
Administrative Law Judge's recommendation
that Ronald Benson's peace officer certification
lapsed in January 1, 2004.
Sheriff Mike Lacy seconded the motion.
The motion passed with 9 in favor and 1
against. (Deputy Director Mike Haddon recused
himself from voting on this motion)."
(Emphasis supplied) R. 757.

Moreover, the motion made by Sheriff Bud Cox was consistent with the POST
Recommendation (included as part of Addendum A-19 to the POST June 9, 2008,
Minutes) which specifically stated that "POST recommends the Council accept the ALJ's
ruling that Benson's certification lapsed on January 1, 2004" (emphasis supplied). R.
800. Thus, although there were two (2) issues before the POST Council, Mr. Benson
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respectfully submits that the POST Minutes conclusively demonstrate that the only

31. The transcription of the audio recording of the POST Council Hearing held on June
9, 2008, further supports Mr. Benson's position that the POST Council voted to approve
the limited and narrow motion that Mr. Benson's peace officer certification had lapsed
but nothing more, to-wit:
"UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: [Sheriff Bud Cox] But you have
to go back to the ALJ's hearing and their facts and findings of
fact. So even though I have great concerns and I think there's
a lot of gray area in this case, I will make the motion that we
accept the ALJ's ruling that Benson's certification lapsed on
January the 1st, 2004.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: And I'll second that.
HEARING OFFICER: Seconded. Any further discussion?
(No audible response.)
HEARING OFFICER: All in favor? (Ayes.)
HEARING OFFICER: Any opposed?
FEMALE SPEAKER: No.
HEARING OFFICER: Okay. Thank you.
MR. DYER: So that I may—I need some clarification. The
recommendation and order was that the certification be
. refused, and I'm hearing you say that it's simply been
lapsed so that the—we have requested that the ALJ's
decision be exonerated. Am I understanding that it's now
been modified, based on this motion?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: The motion is merely what is
stated on the action from POST investigations, and that—
in fact, I read it, so that I wouldn't get it wrong.
MR. DYER: Okay.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: It is the decision, then, from
POST council that Mr. Benson's certification actually
lapsed January the 1st, 2004.
MR. DYER: Okay. And the reason I'm asking (inaudible)—
and I'm not trying to pick at you, is that there are potential
lateral effects of what may or may not (inaudible).
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I think I stated that I thought
that.
MR. DYER: And so I just want to be clear that that's the only
ruling that is being made here today.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: That was my motion.
?o

motion made and adopted by the POST Council was that Mr. Benson's certification
lapsed and nothing more. Thus, by not approving or adopting the remaining Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order issued by the ALJ, Mr. Benson
submits that the POST Council substantively rejected any other findings, conclusions
and/or recommended decisions issued by the ALJ regarding any alleged falsification.
Accordingly, and because the Final Order issued by the POST Director fails to properly
"outline" the decision by the POST Council, Mr. Stephenson illegally and improperly
issued his Final Order in Administrative Rule 728-409-20(1) (2007).
Ill
POST FAILED TO ADDRESS MR. BENSON'S
DISPARATE TREATMENT ARGUMENT.
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) requires that an administrative
agency decide all of the pertinent issues pending before it:
"(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis
of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking
judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the
following...
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring
resolution;9'... Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(c) (2008).
In Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 31 (Utah Ct.App. 1991),
this Court held that ignoring a party's legal contentions violates constitutional due process
protection:

HEARING OFFICER: Okay.
MR. DYER: Thank you." (emphasis and bracketing supplied)
R. 738 at p. 45-48.

O A

"Whether proffered evidence has probative value is in large
part a question of whether the evidence is legally relevant.
Therefore, an agency must at some point address the legal
issues raised by a party appearing before it. Denver & Rio
Grande W. R.R. Co., 287 P.2d at 887 (commission could not
"arbitrarily ignore" contentions raised by parties). Due
process includes "an opportunity to present [one's] case, that
is, [one's] evidence and [one's] contentions." Peatross, 555
P.2d at 283 (emphasis added). Ignoring a party's legal
contentions denies the party a fair "opportunity to be heard
and defend." R.W. Jones Trucking, Inc. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 649 P.2d 628, 629 (Utah 1982)." Tolman at 31 -32
(underlining emphasis supplied).
In Tolman, the Court remanded the proceedings for a new hearing by the
administrative body, in part, because the agency had failed to consider whether the
petitioner was receiving disparate treatment. Id at 33. ALJ Luke and the POST Council
erred by not ruling on the following disparate treatment legal issues raised by Mr. Benson
and, more specifically, that Mr. Lucey (who wrote and submitted his memo to POST) has
not suffered the loss of his peace officer certification.
ALJ Luke's Recommended Order and POST'S Final Order fail to address the
foregoing legal issue of disparate treatment raised by Mr. Benson. Further, during the
course of the evidentiary hearing, ALJ Luke refused to listen to testimony related to this
issue. R. 736 at p. 27, 165-167. Under Tolman and § 63G-4-403(4)(c) of UAPA, Mr.
Benson's right to a decision on this issue has been improperly ignored.

32. This may be, perhaps, because ALJ Luke was under the misconception that
consistency requirements do not apply to POST. In fact, during the November 7, 2007,
hearing regarding Mr. Benson's request for discovery, ALJ Luke ruled that Mr. Benson's
request for production of documents on the issue of consistency of discipline was
irrelevant. R. 736 at p. 27-28.
31

IV
POST COUNCIL ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
IGNORING MR. BENSON'S SUCCESSFUL PASSING
OF THE STATUTORY WAIVER EXAMINATION.
Under § 63G-4-403 of UAPA, the Utah Legislature has mandated that all state
agencies must be consistent in their actions against individuals that are subject to that
agency's (i.e. POST) jurisdiction, to-wit:
"63G-4-403. Judicial review - Formal adjudicative proceedings....
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief and if, on the basis of the
agency record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has
been prejudiced by any of the following:...
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by
statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency
justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that
demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious." Id. (emphasis
supplied).
In interpreting UAPA, our appellate Courts have routinely held
that consistency is a due process notion that must be addressed by the agency. For
example, in Pickett v. Utah Dep't of Commerce, 858 P.2d 187, 191 (Utah Ct.App.
1993),33 the Utah Court of Appeals required the Department of Commerce to demonstrate
a fair and rational basis to justify a deviation from its prior practice:
"We agree with Justice Durham's analysis that this section
requires a petitioner to establish as a prima facie case that the
33. Pickett interpreted § 63-46b-16 (1992). This section was recodified in 2008 as §63G4-403 without any pertinent substantive revisions.
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administrative agency's action in his or her case was
"contrary to the agency's prior practice." If a petitioner meets
this burden, section 16(4)(h)(iii) unambiguously requires that
"the agency justiffvl the inconsistency" with prior decisions.
Therefore, as noted by Justice Durham, establishing this
prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence shifts the
burden to the agency to "demonstrate a fair and rational" basis
for the departure from precedent in the instant case." Pickett
at 191 (Emphasis supplied).34
Michael Hanks was called to testify as a witness for POST in this matter. Mr.
Hanks testified that he had retired from law enforcement for approximately seven (7)
years and allowed his certification to lapse. R. 737 at p. 52-54, 69. Thereafter, Mr.
Hanks was permitted by POST to take the statutory waiver examination after working for
the DOC for approximately 3-6 months. R. 737 at p. 52-54, 69. Upon successful passing
of the statutory waiver examination, POST certified Mr. Hanks and permitted him to
continue his employment with the DOC despite the lapsing of his peace officer
certification. Id. Additionally, Lt. Winward testified that he was aware of prior
exceptions by POST wherein POST permitted other officers to take the statutory waiver

34. Although the case at bar is not a case of discipline based on misconduct, the Utah
Court of Appeals analysis in Lunnen v. Utah Department of Transportation, 886 P.2d 70,
73 (Utah CtApp. 1994) provides additional guidance:
"The agency has the initial burden to show that the discipline was
not disproportionate to the misconduct. Once the agency fulfills that
initial burden, it is incumbent on the employee to raise any due
process concerns, including consistency so that due process issues
can be dealt with properly. The agency, as well as the employee, is
entitled to notice of the issues to be raised. This requirement ensures
that the employee's due process rights are protected while at the
same time provides a fair and reasonable process for all concerned."
(Emphasis supplied). Id.
*tt

examination after they had experienced more than a four (4) year lapse in law
enforcement service. R. 737 at p. 116-117.
Inasmuchas Mr. Benson has taken and successfully passed the statutory waiver
examination in January of 2007, Mr. Benson respectfully submits that POST has acted in
an arbitrary and capricious fashion by not accepting his statutory waiver examination as
curing any alleged deficiencies in the peace officer certification process involving Mr.
Benson.
A.
POST'S failure/refusal to recertify Mr. Benson by statutory waiver
examination is inconsistent with the Agency's prior practice is disproportionate and
therefore invalid under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act.
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(h)(2008)35 requires an appellate court to grant
relief from an agency decision when "the agency action is .. . (iii) contrary to the
agency's prior practice or (iv) otherwise arbitrary and capricious.. . ." In interpreting this
requirement, Utah Courts have placed the burden on the agency to show that the sanction
imposed is not contrary to the agency's prior practice. See, Sorge v. Office of Attorney
General 2006 UT App 2,1(26-29, 128 P.3d 566; Lunnen v. Utah Department of
Transportation, 886 P.2d 70, 73 (Utah Ct.App. 1994); Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil
Service Comm'n, 2000 UT App 235, %L19 30, 8 P.3d 1048.
POST Council and/or POST Director's failure to approve Mr. Benson's
certification incident to his successful taking and passing of the statutory waiver

35. UAPA was recodified in 2008. For the purposes of this appeal, § 63G-4-403 (4)(h) is
substantially the same as previous § 63-46b-16(4)(h).

examination is inconsistent with its prior practice. The record shows that officers
returning to law enforcement work after a lapse greater than four (4) years were allowed
to be recertified by taking and passing the statutory waiver examination. R. 737 at p. 5254, 116-117. The record is undisputed that Mr. Benson was well respected within the law
enforcement community. R. 326 (finding no. 15); R. 542-574; R. 737 at p. 65-66, 77-78.
265, 288, 294-295; R. 738 at p. 18. Thus, there is no valid basis for the refusal of Mr.
Benson's certification after successfully taking and passing the statutory waiver
examination and the refusal would be an inappropriate, inconsistent, and disproportionate
sanction.

V
POST ERRED BY ISSUING AN ORDER ADOPTING
FINDINGS OF FACT THAT ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY
A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE
POST failed to present sufficient evidence to prove upon a preponderance of the
evidence that (1) Mr. Benson willfully submitted falsified information to obtain peace
officer certification and (2) the POST Director improperly exercised his discretion to
deny Mr. Benson's certification by statutory waiver examination. POST has adopted a
preponderance of the evidence standard, to-wit:
"R728-409-7. Purpose of Adjudicative Proceeding....
C. Any decision reached by the Administrative Law Judge
against the respondent involving a violation of Subsection 536-211 (1), must meet the standard burden of proof which will
be a preponderance of evidence." (Emphasis supplied).
Unless after reviewing the evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably
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drawn from the record, this Court can determine that the facts set forth in the Final Order
are more likely correct than not, this Court should reverse the administrative findings
below. See, Harken Southwest Corp. v. Board of Oil Gas and Mining, 920 P.2d 1176,
1182 (Utah 1996).
A.
The Record Evidence does not support a finding on the preponderance of
evidence that Mr, Benson willfully submitted falsified information to POST to
obtain certified status,
ALJ Luke's recommended finding that Mr. Benson willfully engaged in falsifying
information to obtain his certification is not supported by the record as a whole. Mr.
Benson testified at the June 9, 2008, hearing before the POST Council that he never
submitted any false documentation, nor did he ever intentionally misrepresent to anyone
that he held a position he did not actually occupy. R. 738 at p. 17. These tenets were not
disputed by the POST Council nor did the POST Council find any misconduct on the part
of Mr. Benson.36 R.748 at p. 44-48.
Specifically, the evidence is insufficient to carry POST's burden of proving it is
more likely than not that Mr. Benson willfully submitted falsified information to POST to
obtain peace officer certification on the following grounds: (i) it was Mr. Lucey not Mr.
Benson who submitted the Leo Lucey memo to POST; (ii) Mr. Benson did not provide
any false information to POST; and (iii) Mr. Benson did not willfully misrepresent his
peace officer status to POST.
The marshaled evidence that might support the allegation that Mr. Benson

36. See, Argument II hereinabove.

allegedly submitted falsified information to POST is as follows:
Marshaled Evidence that Mr, Benson willfully submitted falsified information
to POST:
•
In September of 2003, Mr. Benson was interested in seeking re-employment
with the DOC as a peace officer. Incident thereto, Mr. Benson contacted POST to
inquire as to the status of his peace officer certification. Mr. Benson spoke with
Jayme Garn, POST Technician, who indicated that POST's records reflected he
was currently employed with the DOC. R. 737 at p. 28. Mr. Benson immediately
corrected Ms. Garn and informed her that POST'S records were inaccurate - he
was not currently employed with the DOC, but that he had filled out a reserve
officer packet. R. 737 at p. 28-29. Accordingly, in order to verify Mr. Benson's
certifiable status Ms. Gam requested verification from the DOC of his reserve
officer status. R. 737 at p. 28-29, 285-286.
•
After speaking with Ms. Gam, Mr. Benson first contacted Lyle Wilde,
because he recalled filling out the reserve officer packet and turning it to Mr.
Wilde. R. 737 at p. 29-30. Mr. Wilde informed Mr. Benson that he did not recall
receiving the reserve officer packet from Mr. Benson. R. 737 at p. 29-31. Mr.
Wilde testified that although Mr. Benson did not work for him in Region IV as a
reserve officer, he did recall Mr. Benson expressing his interest in acting as a
reserve officer. R. 737 at p. 29, 209-210, 212-213, 217; R. 1170.
•
Mr. Benson then contacted Mr. Lucey. Mr. Lucey recalled obtaining the
reserve officer packet for Mr. Benson and him filling it out in his office. R. 737 at
p. 292; R. 1171. Accordingly, Mr. Benson asked Mr. Lucey to contact Ms. Gam
and find out what information/documentation she needed. Id. After speaking with
Ms. Gam, Mr. Lucey wrote a memo to POST stating that Mr. Benson signed a
reserve officer agreement38 in 2000 and Mr. Lucey39 sent the memo to Jayme Gam
37. Ms. Gam was not called as a witness to testify by POST. Thus, Mr. Benson's and
Mr. Lucey's testimony regarding their discussions with Ms. Gam stand unrebutted.
38. Importantly, the Leo Lucey memo does not represent that Mr. Benson was a reserve
officer, only that he had signed the Reserve Officer Agreement in 2000. R. 737 at p. 5758.
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atPOST. R. 700; R. 737 at p. 57-58,91, 103, 158-159. This memo, which has
become known as the "Leo Lucey memo," states in its entirety as follows:
"Retired officer Ron Benson signed a reserve officer
agreement with the Department of Corrections region IV
office of adult probation and parole dated 2-9-2000. A copy
of that agreement can be provided if needed. Thank you for
your time and please advise if you need anything else." R.
700 (emphasis supplied). See, Exhibit C set forth in the
Addendum.
•
Brent Cardall,40 Regional Administrator for Region 3, testified that he told
Mr. Lucey that he needed a letter indicating that Mr. Benson had been a reserve
officer. R. 737 at p. 230-231. Mr. Cardall testified that when Mr. Lucey sent the
memo to him he had the memo date stamped "RECEIVED January 15, 2004 IN
REGION III." R. 737 at p. 230-231; R. 238; R. 700. Mr. Cardall testified that Mr.
Lucey had called him inquiring as to whether he was a reserve for Region III. R.
737 at p. 230-231.
•
Mike Hanks testified that he thought the Leo Lucey memo may41 be a
fabrication because Mr. Benson was not a reserve officer for Region IV and was
not paid a monthly stipend. R. 737 at p. 49-50, 57-60. Mr. Hanks spoke with
Mike Chabrias and Scott Carver who informed him that they did not have personal
knowledge of Mr. Benson being a reserve officer from 2000 to 2004.42 R. 737 at
p. 74-75.
39. In ALJ's Luke's supplementation of the record, she erroneously determines that Mr.
Benson testified that he gave the Leo Lucey memo to POST. R. 1172. Please refer to
Section (i) at page 40 hereinbelow addressing this issue.
40. The record was clear that Ms. Cardall did not get along with Mr. Lucey, their
relationship was rocky and he wanted to get Mr. Lucey out of management thus giving
Ms. Cardall initiative to try and get to Mr. Lucey through Mr. Benson. R. 737 at p. 155186,242-243.
41. ALJ Luke's finding that Mr. Hanks opined that the Leo Lucey memo was, in fact, a
fabrication is inconsistent with the record evidence as Mr. Hanks testified he believed
Mr. Lucey's memo may have been a fabrication.
42. Mr. Hanks admitted he did not do any checking to determine whether Mr. Benson
1Q

•
Lt. Steven Winward conducted an investigation to determine whether the
Leo Lucey memo contained false information. R. 737 at p. 82-83, 85. Lt.
Winward testified that his investigation revealed that Mr. Benson did not follow
the DOC rules for reserve officers including receiving the $20 monthly stipend,
did not keep documentation of annual training records43 and firearms training, did
not have a signed consent agreement, etc. R. 737 at p. 85-86, 88, 96. Lt. Winward
testified that POST certified Mr. Benson in reliance on the information provided in
the Leo Lucey memo. R. 737 at p. 98. Lt. Winward testified that there were
potentially three different regions (Salt Lake, Provo and Park City) Mr. Benson
worked for as a reserve officer for and he investigated two (2) of the three (3)
(excluding Park City)44R. 737 at p. 98-102. Although Lt. Winward's report
concluded falsification was undetermined, at the evidentiary hearing Lt. Winward
testified his "feeling" was that there was falsification of records. R. 533; R. 737 at
p. 108-109.
•
Kami Linhard, POST Technician, testified that in January of 2007 when
Mr. Benson was at POST to take the statutory waiver examination that he told her
he was not employed with the DOC during the years 2000-2004. R. 737 at p. 218219,220-223.

was a reserve officer during the 1998-1999 time period. R. 737 at p. 77.
43. This is an example of bad record keeping by POST not falsification of records.
Although POST did not keep the underlying documentation, POST computer records
reflected that Mr. Benson actually did meet the annual training requirements during 2000
to 2004. R. 737 at p. 128-130; R. 577-578.
44. Lt. Keith testified that Mr. Benson told him he had been a reserve officer in Park
City. However, Lt. Winward testified that he did not do any investigation as to whether
Mr. Benson had been a reserve officer in Park City. As Mr. Benson explained in his
testimony, Mr. Benson told Lt. Winward that he was currently employed with Region IV,
Park City, which is not disputed. R. 737 at p. 281-282. Lt. Winward, mistakenly
confused Mr. Benson's statement that his current AP&P employment in the Park City
area was the same as Mr. Benson's prior reserve officer status in the Park City area.
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•
Mr. Benson testified that he did not receive a stipend, have a supervisor,
complete weapons qualifications, have an ID card, etc. because he did not
understand that he needed to do so. R. 1170-1171, 737 at p. 11, 22-23, 34, 94.
Mr. Benson testified that the law enforcement activities he engaged in from 20002004, was working ongoing cases with prison informants and continued to work
those informants from 1998 to 2003. R. 1171; R. 737 at p. 5-7, 12-15.
i)
The Leo Lucey memo was submitted to POST by Mr, Lucey, not Mr.
Benson.45
ALJ Luke's Order on Motion to Supplement to Record contains five (5) sections:
Preliminary Matters, Opening Statements by counsel, Direct Examination of Mr. Benson,
Cross-Examination of Mr. Benson and Redirect and Re-Cross Examination of Mr.
Benson. R. 1169-1183. Although the first three (3) sections are necessary given the
malfunctioning of the audio recording and lack of a complete transcript incident thereto,
the last two (2) sections (cross examination of Mr. Benson and Redirect/Re-Cross
Examination of Mr. Benson) are unnecessary and should be stricken from the record
because that evidence is included in the audio recording and transcript46 and because ALJ

45. The audio recording of the proceedings below malfunctioned rendering the transcript
of the evidentiary proceedings before ALJ Luke incomplete as to a portion of Mr.
Benson's testimony on direct examination during POST'S in case in chief. Accordingly,
this matter was remanded to POST to permit supplementation/correction of the record. R.
1102. After briefing (R. 1104-1168), ALJ Luke issued her Order Supplementing Record
dated October 13,2009. R. 1169-1183.
46. The transcript begins with the following introduction by ALJ Luke:
"THE COURT: We're back on the record in the
Peace officer certification matter versus Ron
Benson. We are in the middle of direct examination
of Mr. Benson and you may continue.
Q:
(By Mr. Morton) Just a few more questions,
Mr. Benson. ..." R. 737 at p. 5.
Af\

Luke's Order contains at least one (1) material inaccuracy, that of who sent the Leo Lucey
memo to POST, to-wit:
"Mr. Benson testified he was not trying to defraud POST.
Mr. Benson testified he produced his reserve application
when it was asked for. He [Mr. Benson] testified that he gave
POST the letter from Lyle [sic] Lucey because POST wanted
something from the Department of Corrections not him to
verify his reserve status." R. 1172. (emphasis and bracketing
supplied).
Mr. Benson's counsel has carefully reviewed the transcript of Mr. Benson's
testimony and despite ALJ Luke's Order Supplementing the Record, Mr. Benson did not
testify during cross examination that he gave the Leo Lucey memo to POST. It appears
that ALJ Luke's notes were referring to that portion of the transcript of Mr. Benson's
testimony on cross examination to why he did not give the Leo Lucey memo to Ms. Gam,
to-wit:

"6
Q
(By Mr. Morton)
I'll just-this document [Exhibit 16],
7 was it produced to Jami at that time?
8
A
No.
9
Q
And on the Lucey letter—the Lucey memo10 and then you had testified that you asked Lucey to
Thus, the audio recording of the evidentiary hearing and the transcript starts during the
end of POST counsel's, Robert Morton, direct examination of Mr. Benson - thus the
transcript fully contains Mr. Benson's cross-examination testimony. In fact, both Mr.
Morton and his co-counsel, Rick Wyss, were permitted to conduct direct examination of
Mr. Benson. R. 737 at p. 9-10. Since the transcript begins at the conclusion of Mr.
Morton's direct examination, and includes the entirety of Mr. Wyss's direct examination
of Mr. Benson, as well as Mr. Dyer's cross-examination and counsel's follow-up
redirect/re-cross, supplementation of those portions of the transcript which do exist is
improper. Thus, Mr. Benson respectfully submits that the portion of ALJ Luke's Order
Supplementing the Record at R. 1172 inclusive of Cross Examination of Mr. Benson
through Redirect and Re-cross Examination Mr. Benson, should be stricken from the
record and considered by the Court as unnecessary.
41

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

call Jami as to whether or not he recalled you
filling out the packet. Was that your testimony,
basically?
A
Yes."
Q
Well if you had the packet which we've
identified as Exhibit 16, why wouldn't you have
produced it at that time?
A
Because I recall what Jami was asking for
was something from the Department of Corrections,
not something from me. Something from the
Department of Corrections that would verify I was a
reserve.
Q
But again, at that time, at the time the
Lucey memo was submitted, it was never-vou never
produced Exhibit 16, your volunteer reserve officer
application; correct?
A
To Jami?
Q
Right.
A
I did not.
Q
(Inaudible?)
A
No.
Q
Wasn't even produced until January 26th,
2007; correct?
A
I produced it when I was asked for it;
correct.
Mr. Morton: I don't have any more

12 questions." R. 737 at p. 37-38. (Emphasis and bracketing supplied).
Thus, although ALJ Luke's notes reflect her recollection that Mr. Benson testified
during cross-examination that he gave the Leo Lucey memo to POST, the transcript
unequivocally demonstrated that ALJ Luke was mistaken. This mistaken understanding
of ALJ Luke explains her recommended finding that Mr. Benson willfully submitted
falsified information to POST, but unfortunately ALJ Luke was mistaken. Even
assuming, arguendo, that POST can prevail on the issue that the Leo Lucey memo

4?

contained false information, Mr. Lucey, not Mr. Benson, submitted his memo to POST.
Accordingly, Mr. Benson did not provide the allegedly "false" information to POST.
ii)

The Leo Lucey memo does not contain false information,
Mr. Lucey's memo is the only written documentation that was allegedly submitted

to POST to "obtain" Mr. Benson's peace officer certification in 2003. ALJ Luke's
finding that Mr. Lucey's memo was false is erroneous because there is nothing untruthful
in the memo.48 The memo states that Mr. Benson signed a reserve officer agreement dated
February 9, 2000. A copy of the document supporting that conduct was produced by Mr.
Benson when it was requested by Lt. Winward. R. 737 at p. 37-38, 81-82, 219-220, 222223; R. 517-520. Leo Lucey clearly and unequivocally testified "I would not falsify
records for anybody, including Mr. Benson." R. 737 at p. 182. Significantly, ALJ Luke
did not make any finding that Mr. Lucey testified falsely.
Furthermore, former DOC Executive Director Scott Carver, in his written response
to the Legislative Audit, stated as follows:
"One of the most concerning aspects of this section of the
audit is that it accuses a Corrections' manager of sending a
memo to POST with false information. Corrections has
provided documentation to show that this memo [the Leo
Lucey memo] was correct. The only point of such a
47. Mr. Lucey and Lt. Winward testified that Mr. Lucey sent the letter to POST. R. 737
at p. 91,98, 179, 182,184.
48. Although Mr. Lucey's memo was mistakenly dated "9-18-60," Mr. Lucey clarified
his mistake - September 18, 1960, is his birthday and since he wrote the letter close in
time to his birthday, he mistakenly wrote 1960 instead of 2003. R. 737 at p. 178-179.
This simple mistake simply does not rise to the level of willful falsification.
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falsification would have been to avoid sending this employee
through training which the Department and the employee
were entirely willing to do. It had no implications whatsoever
for whether the employee qualified to be hired for his
position. There was no motivation to falsify records." R.
669. See, Exhibit Q set forth in the Addendum. (Emphasis
and bracketing supplied).
Although Lt. Winward testified at the evidentiary hearing that his "feeling"49 was
that there was falsification of records, this "feeling" was a change in position (that was
not based on any new information or evidence) from his written Investigative Report
(See, Exhibit L set forth in the Addendum) in which he concluded that the issue of
falsification was undetermined, to-wit:
"The issue of the falsification of documentation to obtain
peace officer status is undetermined. Based on the
information gathered and individuals I contacted it is difficult
to determine if the memo produced by Leo Lucey in
September of 2003 was done under false pretenses." R. 533.
(emphasis supplied).
At the evidentiary hearing before ALJ Luke, Lt. Winward testified that he did not

49. Lieutenant Winward testified that he had a "feeling" that Mr. Benson, Mr. Lucey and
Lyle Wilde, and possibly even Mr. Carver were complicit in providing false information
to POST in an effort to help Mr. Benson avoid taking the statutory waiver examination,
an exam he easily passed, R= 737 at p. 108-109, 114, Lieutenant Winward testified that
he developed a "feeling" that the information provided to POST was fabricated, however,
this "feeling" wasn't strong enough to make a determination that the information was
false in Lt. Winward's investigative report. R. 737 at p. 107-109, 113-114. Lieutenant
Winward also testifies, however, that there has been no new evidence produced or
brought to his attention subsequent to his investigation that would tend to increase the
strength of this "feeling." R. 737 at p. 115-116. If Lt. Winward believes that these
individuals are complicit in what he believes to be the submission of false evidence, there
would have to be an identical sanction imposed upon these individuals as is imposed upon
Mr. Benson, otherwise, the sanction imposed upon Mr. Benson is inappropriate,
inconsistent, and disproportionate.
AA

conduct any additional investigation after he completed his Investigative Report in which
to base a change in his conclusion. Thus, Mr. Benson respectfully submits that Lt.
Winward's change in position was not based on fact and should not be permitted to
overshadow the compelling evidence in this case to the contrary - evidence consistent
with Lt. Winward's original determination.
iii)
The Record evidence does not support a finding that Mr, Benson willfully
submitted falsified information to POST,
The only information that Mr. Benson allegedly gave to POST (beyond the Leo
Lucey memo) was his oral statement50 to Ms. Garn that he believed he was a reserve
officer with the DOC. Mr. Benson submits that this isolated and single statement cannot
be said to rise to the level of willful falsification under Utah Code Ann. § 53-621 l(l)(d)(i) (1998) because Mr. Benson honestly believed what he told Ms. Gam was
true.
Mr. Benson was a fine peace officer and it would be out of character for him to
willfully submit falsified information. Mr. Benson's record and fine service to law
enforcement are not disputed by POST. R. 326 (finding no. 15); R. 542-574; R. 737 at p.
65-66, 77-78. 265, 288, 294-295; R. 738 at p. 18. In fact, Scott Carver, retired Executive
Director of the DOC, testified that Mr. Benson was a good employee. R. 737 at p. 26566. Mike Hanks, who was the Director of Law Enforcement for DOC before he retired,
testified that "Ron's an excellent officer and I'd be honored to serve with him again." R.

50. Lt. Winward conceded in his cross examination there was not any direct evidence in
writing of willful falsification. R. 737 at p. 150.
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737 at p. 77.
Mr. Benson believed he was a reserve officer and performed reserve officer duties
as they had been explained to him. R. 737 at p. 23-24. Mr. Benson admits that, in
hindsight, he did not follow the specific letter of the DOC reserve officer policies i.e.
receiving a monthly stipend, having a badge issued or be assigned to a supervisor during
the time period from 2000 to 2003. R. 737 at p. 11, 22-23, 34, 94; R. 1170-1171.
However, Mr. Benson respectfully submits that at the time he spoke with Jayme Garn in
2003, he reasonably believed that he was a reserve officer with the DOC.
Mr. Benson filled out his application for certification as a reserve officer in 1998.
R. 737 at p. 20-21,126-127; R. 473, See, Exhibit A set forth in the Addendum. POST
issued a letter certifying Mr. Benson as a reserve officer in 1998. R. 474, See, Exhibit B
set forth in the Addendum.51 Mr. Benson testified that he was told as a reserve officer he
would continue working his confidential informants, which he did. R. 737 at p. 23-24.
Mr. Benson has never received any written notification that his 1998 reserve officer
certification expired, lapsed or was revoked. R. 737 at p. 23-24, 38-39. POST could not
produce any such written documents. R. 737 at p. 126-127. Further, prior to this matter,
no one from the DOC ever told Mr. Benson that he was not a reserve officer between

51. Neither the 1998 reserve officer application nor the 2000 reserve officer packet were
located in Mr. Benson's file. R. 737 at p. 20-21. This is, once again, a case of
POST/DOC bad record keeping - not falsification of records. The testimony at the
evidentiary hearing was clear that the 1998 reserve officer application was valid - not a
falsification - even though it was "missing" from Mr. Benson's file. R. 737 at p. 20-21,
577-578.
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January of 2000 and December of 2004. R 737 at p. 20.
Mr. Benson's failure to follow the DOC's reserve officer policies cannot be used
as a sword that Mr. Benson willfully falsified information where there was a department
wide failure to follow and enforce DOC's policies. In fact, Director Carver's response to
the Legislative Audit, he indicated that the DOC would resolve the department wide
problem of compliance with its reserve officer policies by standardizing reserve officer
practices including the monthly reserve officer stipend, tracking of training hours and
maintaining reserve officer files. R. 676; R. 682-683. In light of the DOC admitted need
to train the Reserve Officer Coordinators to ensure consistency in application of reserve
officer rules and policies then how can Mr. Benson be held to a higher standard?
Before hiring Mr. Benson in a certified position, the DOC requested POST to
confirm Mr. Benson's peace officer status. See, letter from Inga Bowen to Rick Phipps
dated February 10, 2004. R. 539 (See, Exhibit E set forth in the Addendum). Mr. Benson
was subsequently re-hired in March of 2004. R.738 at p. 16. However, POST did not
respond to the DOC request until over a year later when Lt. Jim Keith, POST Director,
confirmed53 that Mr. Benson did not need to take the statutory waiver examination.54 R.

52. Mr. Benson testified that he was never paid a stipend from 1998 to 2000, a time
period when Mr. Benson's reserve officer status does not appear to be in question.52 R.
737 at p. 22, 34. However, Mr. Benson testified that he did nothing different from 1998
to 2000 as compared to 2000 to 2003. R. 737 at p. 22-23. Mr. Hanks testified that he did
not find evidence of Mr. Benson receiving a stipend for reserve officer service between
1998 and 2000. R. 737 at p. 44.
53. In behalf of Lt. Jim Keith/POST, Letisha Shelby, POST In Service Technician, on
April 26, 2008, again confirmed that Mr. Benson was, in fact, certified as a law
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737 at p. 195-202; R. 692-698; R. 476; R. 686-689; R. 540 (See, Exhibit F-I set forth in
the Addendum). When the DOC re-hired Mr. Benson in 2005, he legitimately believed
there were no problems with his certification. R.738 at p. 16-17. Mr. Benson did not
engage in any misconduct, and the POST Council did not find Mr. Benson guilty of any
misrepresentation.55
B.
POST'S Final Order that the POST Director Refused to Reinstate Mr,
Benson's Certification by Statutory Waiver Examination is not Supported by the
Record.

enforcement officer as of March 3, 2004. R. 540.
54. The unrefuted testimony at the evidentiary hearing was that Mr. Benson was willing,
at a minimum, to take the statutory waiver examination. In Scott Carver's, former
Director of Corrections', response to the Legislative audit, he specifically states that the
DOC closely worked with POST in 2005 to confirm that Mr. Benson's certification was
properly issued, to which POST (via Director Jim Keith) confirmed there was no problem
with Mr. Benson's certificate, to-wit:
"e.
The Department worked closely with POST to make the
determination which hinged on whether the individual had received his
required annual 40 hours of training during the time he was not employed
by Corrections. POST determined that he had met these requirements and
did not need to go through the Academy again or take a retest. Corrections
repeatedly communicated with POST about this situation and made it clear
that if POST had any concern about the staff member's training status, we
would send him through the academy again," R,669,
Although Lt. Keith did not originally recall having made determination as to Mr.
Benson's certificate status (R. 737 at p. 199), after refreshing his recollection with POST
Exhibit 6 and Benson Exhibit 10, Lt. Keith recalled having reviewed Mr. Benson's
application, training hours and instructing Letisha Shelby to reactivate Mr. Benson's
certification. R. 737 at p. 195-202; R. 476; R. 686-689; R. 540 (See, Exhibit G and H set
forth in the Addendum).
55. See, Argument II hereinabove.
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The marshaled evidence that might support the POST Director has refused to
accept Mr. Benson's 2007 application to take the statutory waiver examination is as
follows:
Marshaled Evidence that POST Director denied Mr, Benson's Statutory
Waiver Examination
•
On or about January 9, 2007, Mr. Benson's Application was submitted to
and processed by Kami Lindhard, POST technician. Ms. Lindhard testified that
Mr. Benson's Application was "in order." R. 737 at p. 226-227. R. 699 (See,
Exhibit K set forth in the Addendum).
•
In January of 2007, Mr. Benson took and passed the statutory waiver
examination. R. 737 at p. 109.
•
In a meeting in late January of 2007, Mr. Patterson instructed Lt. Winward
to conduct an investigation into Mr. Benson and Mr. Lucey to determine whether
there was falsification in reports and records. R. 737 at p. 113. Lt. Winward
completed his investigative report in February of 2007 and did not conduct any
further investigation subsequent thereto. R. 737 at p. 115.
•
On February 20, 2007, POST Director Richard Townsend sent Mr. Benson
a letter informing him that the POST investigation concluded that Mr. Benson did
not function as a "reserve officer" from 2000 to 2004. R. 525 (POST Exhibit 21);
R. 1. On April 25, 2007, Director Townsend withdrew his February 20, 2007,
letter. R. 2.

•
On May 10, 2007, Lt. Winward issued the Administrative Complaint in this
matter. R. 3-9. The Administrative Complaint, however, does not directly address
Mr. Benson's Application for Certification by statutory waiver examination.
•
Lt. Winward testified that after Mr. Townsend sent the application for
investigation, the application was "in essence" denied, although no written denial
beyond the February 20, 2007, letter that Mr. Benson was not a reserve officer
(which was later rescinded) was ever issued. R. 737 at 121-123.
POST neither issued a written denial of Mr. Benson's application nor called the
current/former POST Director to testify at the evidentiary hearing. Moreover, and
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importantly, the record is absolutely bereft of any evidence demonstrating that POST has
denied Mr. Benson's request to accept his successful passing of the statutory waiver
examination in this matter. Hence, ALJ Luke's finding of fact56 on this issue is without
any support in the record below and should be rejected by this Court as legally
insufficient.
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
For the reasons set forth hereinabove, Mr. Benson respectfully requests that this
Court reverse the POST Final Order in its entirety. Further, this Court should also order
that Mr. Benson's peace officer certification be forthwith reinstated with an effective date
of March 4, 2004 (as previously determined by POST) and to continue thereafter (without
any interruption) as though no adverse action had been taken by POST against Mr.
Benson's peace officer certification.
DATED this *X$

day of r\W

, 2010.

Respectfully submitted,

Phillip W. Dyer, Esq.
Carey A. Seager, Esq.
Attorneys for Appellant Ron Benson
56. ALJ Luke's Finding of Fact number seventeen (17) states:
"Mr. Benson has passed that test but the Director of POST has refused to recertify
him without readmission and graduation from the POST academy."
However, the record proves otherwise. POST Exhibit 20 is a letter from Richard
Townsend, Director of POST, refusing Mr. Benson's certification. R. 525. However,
Mr. Townsend later rescinds his letter in Benson Exhibit 21. R. 724. To date, Mr.
Benson's request for certification due to successful completion of the statutory waiver
examination has yet to be decided by the Director of POST. R. 737 at p. 121-122.
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